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Abstract:
Decades of feminism have freed women from many longstanding
gender roles-less so, however, men. Women now wear pants, but men
still do not wear dresses. Mothers of young children overwhelmingly work
outside of the home, but male housewives remain rare. Tomboys have
achieved some acceptance, but boys are still expected to be boys.
Actresses needn't be sultry to be sexy, but actors are still taller, stronger
and more silent than their sexual partners-except for Woody Allen.
Perversely, the confluence of women's entry into the workplace with
the death of social democracy resulted in recreating the American worker
as a gendered, unencumbered bachelor. Women have been freed to be
men, and men have been freed to be single.
But someone has to wear the dresses, someone has to raise the
children, someone has to go to work, someone has to take care of the old
folks, and someone has to keep up the social calendar. So long as men are
gendered into or out of some of these roles, women will be stuck with the
rest, on overload. The next step of gender equality requires limiting market
equality in order to loosen male gender roles.
* Professor of Law, S.J. Quinney College of Law, University of Utah. A.B. 1979,
Harvard College; J.D. 1984, Yale Law School.
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Market Gender Constructs: Men Will Be Men And So Will Women

So far, gender equality has meant that women have become freer to be
men; now the task is to free men to take on women's roles. Social support
for childcare requires that it be transformed from women's work to
citizens' responsibility.
Feminism and other civil rights movements have subverted gender
status in an unexpectedly close alliance with the market and the very
different agenda that the market encourages. Markets have a dynamic and
a baseline of their own that make certain wrongs obvious and others hard to
see. The market alliance powered civil rights victories. But it also limits
the change: our markets continue to function within a strong culture of
status.
Decades of feminism have freed women from many longstanding
gender roles. Men, however, remain more constrained. Women now wear
pants, but men still do not wear dresses. Mothers of young children
overwhelmingly work in the paid labor market, but male housewives
remain rare. Tomboys have won some acceptance, but boys are still
expected to be boys.
The result is predictable. As women have taken on traditional male
roles, they have continued to be responsible for female roles as well.,
Someone, after all, has to take care of the children and do the laundry and
the cooking and the cleaning and the shopping and the entertaining.
In the upper echelons of the workplace, female executives have
succeeded when, just like their male counterparts, they have put their
careers ahead of family obligations and responsibilities. In the rest of the
economy, women-now dominating both the routine clerical workforce
and the part-time swing labor market-have also won the right to be treated
as men. Instead of workplaces adapting to the needs of families, women
have adapted to the needs of the workplace, taking lower pay and less
interesting work in exchange for at least marginally greater time-flexibility.
The gender reverse, however, has not been true. In the upper
echelons, men are still assumed to have a wife or to otherwise be willing
and able to put their lives on hold when the office calls. In the less rarified
1. "Traditional" is a weasel word; in my experience usually it means "the way things

were when and where I [i.e., the speaker] was a kid." The "tradition" of excluding women
from the paid labor market is a recent innovation in most of the cultures and economies
from which we trace our various histories. In my own family, my mother, my
grandmothers, and at least some of their mothers all worked for pay. Only for a historical
moment in the late 1950s and early 1960s did this seem odd. In many of the European
peasant cultures from which many of us descend, women were often more likely than men
to be market participants: the men were near-subsistence farmers and it was the women who
took the surplus to market. Still, even if the details of gender roles seem unstable and shift
over time and place, the fact of gender role separation is far more stable.
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strata, men remain in short supply in those sectors of the job market
organized to accommodate a significant family role. Often this is due to
more or less overt discrimination-it is not easy for a semi-skilled young
man to get a pink collar job. Deindustrialization and the feminization of
the back-office working class have left too many uneducated young men
without any socially useful role at all-still barred from nurturing roles in
the family, no longer needed in the workplace, little left to do but riot or rot
in jail.
In short, much of the success of the feminist movement has been in
allowing women to act like men.
A.

The Unencumbered Worker: Liberationfrom the Family Wage

In one area, men are now treated more like women. The male "family
wage" is dead. Male wages are still higher than female wages, but on an
hourly basis the gap has shrunk dramatically, and in the bottom half of the
income distribution almost entirely by a decline in male wages. 2 In the
great middle of the income distribution, men have lost the ability support a
family financially, without gaining a new role in actual family activities.
But this male to female gender reversal can be seen the other wayperhaps it is more accurate to see the departed family wage as having itself
been a gender reversal. Men were treated like women, as responsible
caregivers and supporters of dependants. The demise of the family wage
means that the employment market now treats men and women alike as
single, unencumbered monads, each responsible for himself or herself
alone. In short, 3family men and women alike have been reconstructed as
single bachelors.
In the old days (say back in the days of the Feminine Mystique),4
status rules limited the labor market and imposed a gendered division of
labor. Women were barred from selling their labor on the same terms as
men. Conversely, men were imagined to be free of responsibility for the
cooking, cleaning, laundry, shopping, entertainment, and, of course, care
for the children and the elderly. Husbands, with wives to live their lives for
them, were free to work unencumbered by household responsibilities.
2. LAWRENCE MISHAL ET AL., THE STATE OF WORKING AMERICA 2000-200 1, at 126-29

(2001) (showing that men's wages have declined dramatically in the bottom half of the
income distribution, while women's wages have been flat in the center of the distribution
and dramatically risen at the top; falling male wages account for approximately 65% of the
closing of the gender gap).
3. See, e.g., Vanessa Fuhrmans, Company Health Plans Try to Drop FamiliesEmployees with Spouses, Kids Face New Surcharges as Employers Seek to Curb Costs,
WALL ST. J., Sept. 9, 2003, at BI (describing reductions in family benefits).
4. BETTY FRIEDAN, THE FEMININE MYSTIQUE 15-32 (1963) (discussing the invisibility
of the "problem that has no name").
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The social reality has changed, but the market still prefers
unencumbered workers. The two-spouse, one-income family is nearly
extinct. Only a quarter of Americans live in a two-spouse household with
children; 5 of those, less than a third live on a single income. 6 That is, only
9.5% of the population lives in a one-income, two-parent family with
children.7
Over the last several decades, employers have found that they do not
need to pay a family wage. With the breakdown of the status rules,
workers can be paid something closer to their replacement cost as
individuals, leaving families to make up the deficit by working longer
hours. Thus, household incomes in the bottom 90% of the income
distribution have stagnated in real terms for the past three decades, while
the number of hours of paid labor has increased.8 Specifically, male wages
5. The proportion.of households made up of two spouses with children (of one or both
spouses) dropped from about 40.3% in 1970 to 24.1% in 2000. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
AMERICA'S FAMILIES AND LIVING ARRANGEMENTS 2000, at P20-537, at 3, Fig. 1. (June 2001),
available at http://landview.census.gov/population/www/socdemo/hh-fam.html. See also
U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, DP-I: PROFILE OF GENERAL DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS: 2000
[hereinafter TABLE DP-1] (indicating that 23.5% of households were made up of a married
couple with children), available at:
http://factfinder.census.gov/servlet/BasicFactsTable?lang=en&_vt-name=DEC_2000 SFI
U_DP1&_geoid=01000US (last visited Nov. 3, 2003). Multiplying the number of married
couple families with children (24,835,505) by the average family size (3.14) indicates that
approximately 77,983,485 people live in married couple with children households, which is
approximately 27.7% of the total population (281,421,906). Id. (author's calculations). See
also ROBERT PUTNAM,

BOWLING ALONE: THE COLLAPSE AND REVIVAL OF AMERICAN

COMMUNITY 277 (2000) (reporting that in 1997, 26% of adults were married with children at

home).
6.

2000,

U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, AMERICA'S FAMILIES AND LIVING ARRANGEMENTS MARCH
DETAILED TABLES FOR CURRENT POPULATION REPORT, P20-537, available at

http://www.census.gov/population/www/socdemo/hh-fam/p20-537_00.html (indicating that
one-third of two parent households with children have only one income: of 25,771,000
married couples living with children, 7,736,000 (30%) had only one spouse in the labor
force. An additional 774,000 (3%) had one parent unemployed). See also MISHAL, supra
note 2, at 98 (showing that for two parent households, the average number of hours worked
in the top three income quintiles is more than full-time for each parent).
7. Derived from tbl.DP-1, supra note 5, by multiplying the number of one-income,
two-parent families with children (8,510,000) by the average family size (3.14) to yield
26,721,400 persons, or 9.5% of the total population (281,421,906). Note that this includes
recombined families, in which the two parents are not necessarily biologically related to the
children.
8. MISHAL, supra note 2, at 121, 124-28 (demonstrating that despite gains in the late
1990s, hourly wages for each of the bottom five deciles were lower in 1999 than in 1973);
tbl.DP-1 at 115 (showing that the increase in hours worked was the largest contributor to
income growth in the last decade with the typical middle income couple working 3,885
hours per year; average annual hours worked increased from 1,758 in 1967 to 1,898 in
1998-three extra weeks of work per year). This was a period of greatly increased
inequality in general. See THOMAS PIKETTY & EMMANUEL SAEZ, INCOME INEQUALITY IN THE
UNITED STATES, 1913-1998, fig.13 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No.
8467, 2001), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w8467 (showing an increase in
inequality during this period: the share of top decile of salary earners went from roughly
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have declined-rather dramatically in the lower half of the income
distribution-and women have added paid labor to make up the loss. 9 The
unpaid labor of the housewife, of course, cannot simply disappear
(although it can be reduced by eliminating the children that give rise to
much of it).10
B.

Market Liberty vs. Status Slavery
The first generation of civil rights law (for feminism, the Frontiero1

25% during the 1947-67 period to almost 35% in the late 1990s).
9. MISHAL, supra note 2, at 124-28 (showing that hourly wages in 1999 for men were
lower than in 1973 in the bottom six deciles and barely changed for the next three deciles).
Middle income household incomes would have fallen but for increased work by wives.
"[T]hirty years ago, middle income parents spent 3/4 of their weeks in the labor market ....
By 1998 that share had increased to 92%." Id. at 93-109. The proportion of women in the
labor force increased steadily from about 34% in 1950 to 60% and rising in 1997. KRISTIN
E. SMITH & AMARA BACHU, WOMEN'S LABOR FORCE ATTACHMENT PATERNS AND
MATERNITY LEAVE: A REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE, fig. 1 (Population Division, U.S. Bureau
of
the
Census,
Working
Paper
No.
32,
1999),
available
at
http://landview.census.gov/population/www/documentation/twps0032/twpsOO32.html.
Conversely, the number of married women caring for children full-time dropped
dramatically from roughly 30% of women as late as 1970 to about 14% in 1990. JOHN P.
ROBINSON & GEOFFREY GODBEY, TIME FOR LIFE, THE SURPRISING WAY AMERICANS USE
THEIR TIME

9-10 (1997).

10. In 1985, time diary studies estimated that women not in the workforce spent about
39 hours per week on childcare, housework and shopping; women in the workforce spent
somewhat less: about 26 hours per week. ROBINSON & GODBEY, supra note 9, at 105, 334.
Time diary studies consistently provide lower numbers than the other leading methodology,
the National Survey of Families and Households. Id. at 100. Moreover, these figures
presumably understate the number of hours women with children spend on these matters,
since 32% of employed women have no parental responsibilities at all. Id. at 9. For women
with children, childcare took 3.6 hours per week for employed mothers and 7.0 hours for
unemployed mothers in the 1985 study, differing from 2.7 hours and 9.3 hours respectively
in 1965, in each case considerably less than the hours spent in "core housework" and
shopping. Id at 105 tbl.3. Consistent with Robinson & Godbey's general conclusion that
Americans have adjusted to increased employment demands by reducing the number of
children they have, these numbers apparently reflect an increase in the amount of time spent
on childcare per child. Id. at 11, 106. However, their figures also suggest that children
raised by single working parents receive essentially no primary childcare time. Id. at 106.
Robinson & Godbey also contest the well-known claim that employed women simply add
housework to their employment chores. In the aggregate, at least, women have reduced
housework by reducing childrearing, and there is no "leisure gap." Id. at 4, 54. For the
counter-claim, see ARLIE HOCHSCHILD, THE SECOND SHIFT: WORKING PARENTS AND THE
REVOLUTION AT HOME (1989) (finding that women work longer hours than men and are
more likely to compromise on career goals with part-time work). Regardless of whether
women work more than men or vice versa, the proportion of families with children with a
full-time caretaker has dropped dramatically (see supra note 5 and accompanying text),
obviously leading to increased time pressures on those families, if not Americans as a
whole.
11. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973) (establishing strict scrutiny for
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principle of formal gender neutrality) fought for market over status.
Markets in their ideal form are anonymous, anti-hierarchal, and anti-status.
On the New York Stock Exchange, perhaps our paradigmatic market, there
is no Jim Crow because there is no history. Black dollars are as good as
white ones, new money is as good as old money; indeed, money laundering
rules notwithstanding, criminal dollars generally are indistinguishable from
honest ones. Products, too, are (or should be) priced according to the
characteristics of the product, not those of the buyer or the seller. When a
woman sells stock she receives the same price as a man; not even
unconscious gender bias exists, because there is no way of identifying the
seller. Markets, left to their own, do not respect traditional role boundaries,
or indeed any traditions or histories at all.' 2 Yet while markets are antistatus, they are not egalitarian-markets will always redistribute
from those
3
with less market power to those with more market power.
Early anti-discrimination law sought to import the market ideal of
anonymity into the labor market, where anonymity is, of course,
impossible. Its formal equality or meritocracy norm is simply the market
norm of anonymity. Individuals ought to be treated according to their
relevant characteristics-the money they have to spend or the product,
labor, or skill they have to sell-disregarding other personal characteristics.
We should be color-blind because the market is color-blind, treating black
money the same as white money. Employees should be paid based on
merit (i.e., at the rate they would receive in a hypothetical anonymous
market) without regard to irrelevant status characteristics.
Race-blind meritocracy is the ideal of the stock market. Or to put it
slightly differently, the first struggle of the civil rights movement was to
replace feudal hereditary castes with capitalist markets. The first task of
civil rights law, like the first generation of feminism, was to strike blows
for the market. Minorities and women should be allowed to participate in
the market as anonymous equals, no longer burdened by the status-based
hierarchies of the past. For the first time, a woman willing and able to act
like a man would be able to sell her services just like a man.
The first task of civil rights law, then, was to achieve that majestic
equality of the law that, in Anatole France's famous words, forbade both
rich and poor from sleeping under the bridges of Paris. 14 For under our
Ancien Regime as well, money alone was not enough to escape the
classifications based on sex).
12. This issue has been discussed by the author elsewhere. See generally, Daniel
Greenwood, Beyond the Counter-MajoritarianDifficulty: Reconstructing the Law/Politics
Distinction Through A Typology of DemocraticDecision-making, 53 RUTGERS L. REV. 781,
827-31 (2001); Daniel Greenwood, Enronitis and the Fictional Shareholder (unpublished
essay on file with author).
13. Id.
14. See ANATOLE FRANCE, THE RED LILY 95 (Winifred Stephens trans., 1908) (1894).
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strictures of caste and gender.' 5 The market is a splendid tool for breaking
down those restrictions, as even Marx recognized:
The bourgeoisie [through the market], wherever it has got the
upper hand, has put an end to all feudal, patriarchal, idyllic
relations. It has pitilessly torn asunder the motley feudal ties that
bound man to his "natural superiors," and has left remaining no
other nexus between man and man than naked self-interest, than
callous "cash payment." It has drowned the most heavenly
ecstasies of religious fervor, of chivalrous enthusiasm, of
philistine sentimentalism, in the icy water of egotistical
calculation ....
The bourgeoisie has torn away from the family
its sentimental veil, and has reduced the family relation to a mere
money relation.' 6
In his characteristically overly deterministic way, Marx assumes, with
Richard Epstein, that the market or the bourgeoisie will overcome caste by
itself, without need of civil rights laws.' 7 One need not accept that
optimistic view to accept the underlying logic of both Marx and Epstein8
market ideals point towards the end of caste-based discrimination.'
C.

Back to the State of Nature."The Market and Family

But stock is not worth more when it is owned by someone with higher
expenses. A worker's productivity is not increased by the number of
children he or she has at home. If anything, the opposite is true. The
morality of the market demands that we ignore irrelevant outside
characteristics, and it classifies children as both "irrelevant" and "outside"
15. See, e.g., Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) (upholding Jim Crow laws);
Patricia Williams, The ObligingShell: An Informal Essay on FormalEqual Opportunity,87
MICH. L. REV. 2128, 2138-43 (1989) (describing continuing realities of caste-based
limitations); Patricia Williams, Alchemical Notes: Reconstructing Ideals from

Deconstructed Rights, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 401, 408 (describing the continuing
"struggle to set up transactions at arms' length... [in] that creative commerce by which I
may be recognized as whole, with which I may feed and clothe and shelter myself, by which
I may be seen as equal-even if I am stranger. For me, stranger-stranger relations are better
than stranger-chattel.").
16. KARL MARX & FREDERICK ENGLES, COMMUNIST MANIFESTO 11 (Int'l Publishers
1976) (1948).
17. Id., and see RICHARD EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS 3, 248 (1992) (advocating

repeal of anti-employment discrimination laws on ground that they are unnecessary and
unproductive, in part because discrimination is irrational and will not survive in a
competitive market without the assistance of Jim Crow).
18. In sharp contrast to my view, however, Epstein identifies the market norm as the
property principle that property owners have unrestricted discretion to refuse to deal.
EPSTEIN, supra note 17, at 3. In my view, that property principle is a hold-over from feudal
aristocratic ideals; markets, in contrast, begin with an ideal of anonymity in which only the
product, not the seller or buyer, is relevant.
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for these purposes. (As Martha McClusky pointed out in this panel, having
a wife at home does increase the worker's productivity, and in the old twospouse, one-income family, having a wife at home partly counterbalances
the effect of the children. But a wife and children are two different things.
One-third of children are being raised by single parents, grandparents or
other relatives, unquestionably reducing the custodial guardian's market
value.' 9 The other children surely reduce at least the primary caretaker's
productivity as well.)
From the market perspective, having children is no different than
being black or having a taste for caviar or Porsches, or even being lazy or
less competent. The market ideology says that a worker's pay should be
related to what she produces, not what she needs or deserves. Thus, market
equality is an equality of dollars and products. One citizen's dollars should
buy as much as any other's, and one seller's products should sell for the
same price as another's of similar quality. The market, therefore, is anticaste, anti-racist, and anti-feudal because it classifies the personal
characteristics of buyers and sellers as irrelevant. (Citizenship based views,
in contrast, start with a different baseline and therefore reach different
results. The principle that we are all equal citizens suggests that as equal
partners, we are presumptively entitled to equal participation (in some
sense) in social product, including provision for our basic needs as citizens,
education, housing, medical care, and minimum income. The market
in
promises equal respect for equal dollars or equal product. Democracy,
20
contrast, promises equality of citizenship and equal respect for people.)
Support for families as caretaking units for children was never strong.
Moreover it was closely linked to the anti-market status roles of the gender
hierarchies. Under the pressure of the increased strength of market norms,
and the first generation civil rights norms that largely tracked them, it
simply collapsed.
D. Adapting to the Market: The Freedom to Be a Man
People, men and women alike, adapt to market demands as best they
can. For all but the elite, the best way to be an unencumbered worker no
longer is to be (or have) a husband with a wife at home. Husbands,
19. About 66% of children live in a two-parent family; about 23% live with a single
parent. The balance live with other relatives (8%), nonrelatives (2%), with less than .5% in
group quarters or on their own. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, CENSUS 2000 SUMMARY FILE I
(SFI)TBL.P28,

RELATIONSHIP BY

HOUSEHOLD TYPE FOR THE POPULATION UNDER

18,

available at http://factfinder.census.gov (indicating that of 72,293,812 children, only
47,682,383 (66%) lived in a married couple family with its own children, and 16,812,254
lived in a single parent household).
20. See Greenwood, Counter-MajoritarianDifficulty, supra note 12, at 790-803, 827-
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encumbered or not, cannot earn enough to support a family. The second
best solution is to drop responsibilities: to become unencumbered, without
children, cooking or other avoidable responsibilities.
The failures and casualties are obvious-one-third of our poor are
children; 2 1 divorce rates reflect, at least to some degree, the economic
reality that fathers are better off without children (even if that means
without a wife as well); 22 child birth rates are declining; 23 there is
essentially no primary parenting time for the one-quarter of children raised
by a single parent; 24 and the disturbing reality is that the strongest predictor
of poverty is dependent child care.25
The increase in single motherhood is in part a story of professional
women unable to find suitable mates in a society where women and men
alike still expect the male member of a heterosexual couple to be taller,
richer, older and more accomplished. That is, while women have been
21. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, POVERTY IN THE U.S. 2001 1, 4, available at
http://www.census.gov/prod/2002pubs/p60-219.pdf (stating that 35.7% of the poor are
under the age of 18 years). Looking at the problem of child poverty another way, 16% of
children are poor. Id. at 1. This is considerably higher than the overall poverty rate, which
is 11.7% using the Census Department definitions. Id. Moreover, the poverty rate for
families headed by a female with no husband present is 26.4%, as opposed to a rate of only
4.9% for married couple families and 19.9% for individuals not living with any relatives.
Id. at 3 tbl. 1 & 7. 48.9% of children living in such female headed households are poor. Id.
at 4. Thus, both childhood and single parenthood (especially for women) strongly correlate
with poverty. Bad as the current 26.4% poverty rate for female headed households is,
however, it still reflects the vast improvements of the feminist success in using market
norms to break down barriers to women's employment; in 1959, the poverty rate for female
headed households was 49.6%, almost twice as high as today. Id. at 21 tbl.A-l.
22. See, e.g., CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, COHABITATION, MARRIAGE,
DIVORCE
AND
REMARRIAGE
IN
THE
U.S., at 4 (2002),
available at
http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/series/sr_23/sr23_022.pdf (stating that "for a man, the
retention of income combined with a reduction of family size [resulting from divorce] may
actually result in an increase in his new household per capita income"). The divorce rate
doubled between the 1950s and early 1960s, when it was around 2.1-2.6, and it peaked at
5.3 in 1979. CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, 43 MONTHLY STATISTICS
REPORT #13, at 4 fig.2 (1995). The marriage rate, in contrast, has changed less dramatically
and less consistently, but has been declining steadily since its relative peak of 10.9 in 1972.
Id. at 3 and fig.2. In 2001, the marriage rate was 8.4 and the divorce rate was 4.0. CTR. FOR
DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, 50 NAT'L VITAL STATISTICS REPORT #14, at tbl.1
(2002), available at http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nvsr/nvsr50_14.pdf.
23. American fertility rates-i.e., births per 100 women aged 15-44---dropped steeply
from a peak of 118 in 1960 to around 60-70 by the mid-1970s and have been relatively
stable since then. CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, 50 NAT'L VITAL
STATISTICS
REPORT
#14,
at 1 fig.1 & 2 tbl.A (2002), available at
http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nvsr/nvsr50_l4.pdf. For 2001, the fertility rate was 14.5. Id.
at tbl. 1.
24. See supra notes 8 and 9 and accompanying text.
25. See, e.g., THE N1CHD EARLY CHILD CARE RESEARCH NETWORK, POVERTY AND
PATTERNS OF CHILD CARE, in CONSEQUENCES OF GROWING UP POOR 100-31 (Greg. J.

Duncan & Jeanne Brooks-Gunn eds., 1997).
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freed to be men, men are expected to be even more so. The increase in
single motherhood is also a story of working class men who can no longer
contribute to the family at all-due to the collapse of the industrial factory
system, the decline of the family wage, and the drying up of nonprofessional jobs.
Young men are a central component of the organization of many
societies. 26 As a gross generalization, societies tend to take one of three
approaches to their young men. Commonly, they segregate them,
organizing them into all-male armies sent to fight one another and
sometimes even to kill off significant numbers. 27 Or they direct them to
highly organized study or more organized employment and marry them off,
enmeshing them in social contexts that will move them out of the
dangerous rebellion of youth and into established paths.28 Or they jail
them.2 9
26. Shakespeare commented in Julius Caesar about dangers of young men with a "lean
and hungry look." WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, JULIUS CAESAR I, ii, 191. This view is widely

shared by other observers as well.

See, e.g.,

SIGMUND FREUD, CIVILIZATION AND ITS

78 (Strachey trans., 1962) (describing primal myth of a band of brothers
uniting to kill authoritarian father); CHARLES HENTON COOLEY, SOCIAL ORGANIZATION 2735 (1909, 1993) (describing the threat of "ambitious young men" and how stable societies coopt them into "supporting existing ascendancies"); TALCOT PARSONS, Age and Sex in the
Social Structure of the US., reprintedin ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY 93, 102 (1954)
(describing "youth culture" as having a "strong tendency to develop in directions which are
either on the borderline of parental approval or beyond the pale," and in particular
describing the early twentieth century German youth movements as "a generalized revolt
against conventions" and an "important relation to the background of National Socialism").
27. See, e.g., MICHAEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE & PUNISH 210-211 (Sheridan trans.,
1977) (describing use of military and other disciplines for social control); DAVID
MAYBURY-LEWIS, AKWE-SHARANTE SOCIETY 306 (1974) (describing "men's houses");
Robert Carniero, War and Peace, in STUDYING WAR: ANTHROPOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES 1218 (S.P. Rayna and R.E. Downs, eds., 1993) (describing "pervasiveness" of war from
Ancient Greece through Roman Empire to the Middle Ages); Clark McCauley, Conference
Overview, in THE ANTHROPOLOGY OF WAR 18 (Jonathan Hass et al. eds., 1990) (describing
socialization of squad members in U.S. army to create internal solidarity).
28. See, e.g., CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, COHABITATION, MARRIAGE,
DIVORCE
AND REMARRIAGE IN THE
U.S., at 3 (2002),
available at
http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/series/sr_23/sr23_022.pdf (stating that married men and
women exhibit less risky behavior than unmarried ones). "Less educated young men,
however, have a lower probability of marriage in recent years." Id. at 4.
29. Foucault cites Bentham's Panopticon prison as a way of subjecting men to constant
surveillance. MICHAEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE & PUNISH 210-211 (Sheridan trans., 1977)
(describing Panopticonism as a "state of permanent visibility that assures that automatic
functioning of power ...polyvalent in its application"). He further contends that prison was
also a critical way of forcing men into the early mercantile economy. Id. at 25. Jail remains
significantly important in controlling young men. For example, "[i]n June 1998 the number
of adult men in prison or jail equaled 2.3 percent" in the United States, and those men were
overwhelmingly young men when incarcerated. Lawrence F. Katz & Alan B. Krueger, The
High-Pressure U.S. Labor Market of the 1990's, 1999 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECONOMIC
ACTIVITY 1, 40 (1999).
DISCONTENTS
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We have not engaged in many wars in recent years; marriage still
requires (as it usually has historically) that the male be able to bring in an
income.
Instead, we now seem to depend on jail to keep male
unemployment at socially acceptable levels. The U.S. incarceration rate is
the highest in the developed world. 30 Adding that incarceration rate to our
unemployment rate suggests that we are doing no better in creating jobs for
young men than the famously rigid high unemployment economies of
social-democratic Europe.31 We have merely replaced the dole with the
lock-up for young men.
Men who have not graduated high school now have no social purpose
at all. And the women they would have helped support are now on their
own, supporting children and attempting to make a living in an economy
that pays them only according to their own, presumably low, bargaining
power.
Women, then, have won the privilege of being treated as men-as

30. Peter Slavin, Life After Prison:Lack of Services Has High Price, WASH. POST, Apr.
24, 2000, at Al.
31. See Crime: Locking Them Up, ECONOMIST, May 9, 1998, at 1 ("America now has
610 prisoners for every 100,000 people; Britain, by contrast has 110 prisoners per 100,000;
France and Germany around 90."); see also Bruce Western & Katherine Beckett, How
Unregulatedis the U.S. Labor Market: The PenalSystem as a Labor Market Institution, 104
AM. J. SOCIOLOGY 1030, 1036 (1999) (reporting 1993 incarceration rates of 80 per 100,000
for Germany, 519 per 100,000 for the U.S. in general and 1,947 per 100,000 for U.S.
Blacks. Since prisoners are overwhelmingly male, male numbers would be close to double
these.). Western & Beckett, treating the incarcerated as unemployed, estimate that the U.S.
unemployment rate, so redefined, would have been 1.9% higher in 1995. Id. at 1039. Katz
& Kreuger, supra note 29, in contrast, use the current definition of unemployment and
attempt to estimate the effects of incarceration. Presumably, many current prisoners would
not be in the labor force were they not in prison and therefore would not be counted in
American unemployment figures: Katz & Krueger's estimates suggest that including the
prison population would increase the unemployment rate by only a small amount. Katz &
Kreuger, supra note 29, at 42-44 (estimating that the doubling of the prison population since
1985 has reduced the male unemployment rate by only .3%). In contrast, the German
Economic Minister reportedly claimed that the German "unemployment rate would be 1.5
percentage points lower if we had as many people sitting in jail as the U.S. has." Martin
Waller, Werner Muller, TIMES LONDON, Feb. 12, 2002, at 31. According to Katz &
Kreuger, Germany had a lower average unemployment rate than the U.S. in the 1960s,
1970s and 1980s. In the 1990s, the German average unemployment rate was 0.8% higher
than ours (6.6% as opposed to 5.8%) before adjusting for prison populations (or,
presumably, for the more lenient understandings of labor force participation, resulting in
higher reported unemployment, prevalent in Europe). Katz & Kreuger, supra note 29, at 10
tbl.2. Western & Beckett, who do not correct for labor force participation, show generally
consistent results: reported U.S. unemployment has been lower than the European average
since 1984, but when the incarcerated population is added, the U.S. unemployment rate is
higher than the comparable European average in almost every year. Western & Beckett,
supra, at 1042, fig.2c. Even if only one-third of the prison population is included as
unemployed, the U.S. and European results are very close, with Europe clearly ahead until
1993. Id.at 1042-43.
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unencumbered and fully-available workers in the market. Undereducated
young men, in large numbers, have been freed from the workplace entirely,
as employers have found women to be more pliable, skilled, and compliant
in the "pink collar" sectors, and have transferred factory jobs overseas.
E.

Market Equality Against the Family

The market norm seeks to treat us as equals in equal denial of our
family obligations. Increasing numbers of Americans attempt to win a
competitive advantage in this new arena by limiting those
responsibilities-unencumbering themselves and selling their labor at
prices reflecting only their individual needs. So far, the liberal program has
helped them to do it.
But the problem still remains. Now that women have been freed to be
unencumbered bachelors in the workplace, someone must still take care of
the children. A bachelor's workplace does not address this problem any
more than the old "family-man-with-wife-at-home" workplace did. Until
the work of raising children, caring for the elderly, educating the young,
and mentoring the adolescents is respected, honored, well-paid, and central,
the struggle for gender equality will only have just begun. Gender equality
means that men must be allowed and encouraged to take on women's work,
and the market must be coerced (it cannot do it otherwise) into paying for
families and not just monads.
In the market, family support starts with simple old-fashioned social
democracy-separating the financial costs of child-rearing and dependant
support from individual wages that the market seeks to set without regard
to "external" responsibilities. Education (from preschool to university),
retirement, medical care, family housing support, social insurance-these
are the big expenses that separate the connected from the monads and that
the market cannot properly account for in wages. We do a great job
socializing the cost of roads, gasoline, farmers, Western water and
ranchers. Now we need to extend that support to families.
And someone has to wear the dresses. In our culture, the necessary
fundamental changes will not happen until boys can wear dresses and still
win the girls. The girls are dating boys who have started coloring their
hair, wearing earrings, even a bit of makeup. But tall, dark and silent wins
the girl every time-who wants a sensitive guy (it is just a disguise for selfcenteredness) when a primeval hunter is around?
II.

Are Families Overprivileged? Exploring the Market Norm

Are families already unfairly benefiting from existing legal norms?
This paper has suggested that families ought to receive more, but perhaps
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they already get too much. Other scholars have provided strong evidence
that, for example, the tax code benefits couples in which the husband works
at a high paying job and the wife stays home. 32 To begin with, it is
important to distinguish between households (as defined by the tax code or
standard econometric measures), couples, an image of a family as a
husband and wife with 2.3 children, and "families" as I have used in this
paper. While I use the term family for convenience, I do not mean to
restrict the term to married couples with children.
Family is centrally about caretaking for non-income earning
dependents who are unable to command market wages on their own. The
key, then, is that the household contains one or more income earning adults
who are paying for and otherwise taking care of one or more individuals
who need care-paradigmatically children, but also disabled or retired
adults.
Marriage alone is irrelevant.
Two able-bodied, employable
individuals forming a household, whether married or not, do not pose the
issues that I raise here. If a couple decides to specialize, with one spouse
(the husband) focusing on employment and the other (the wife) on
homemaking, there is no special reason to be worried that the market will
treat them unfairly. Presumably the husband will be more productive with
a wife at home to live his life for him, and his pay should reflect that
increased productivity. The market likely will pay this couple more or less
than if they did not so specialize, but there is nothing particularly wrong
with this market differential. Accordingly, this paper does not argue for the
kind of tax benefits given to one-income married couples that Martha
McClusky describes. 33 Such tax benefits given to a small group of highly
paid men with stay-at-home wives who are chiefly engaged in supporting
the income earner's ability to earn his high wage do not count as family
support under this paper's analysis-these tax expenditures are not going to
support dependents who are unable to participate in the work force.
Similarly, while I use the term family for convenience to refer to a
household with dependents, nothing in this argument requires or suggests
that the household must be defined by blood or legal ties. It is the
dependence that creates a family, not the blessing of a church or justice of
the peace, let alone a Gilbert & Sullivan-style notion that the

32. Bernie D. Jones, Single Motherhood By Choice, Libertarian Feminism, and the
Uniform ParentageAct, 12 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 419 (2003).
33. Martha McCluskey, Caring for Workers: Beyond the Divides of Home/Market,
Maternalism/Antimatemalism, and Dependency/Pleasure 2 (May 21, 2002) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with author and to be presented at Gender, Work and Caretaking
Session, Law & Society Annual Meeting 2002) (describing and criticizing tax benefits given
to highly-paid one-income couples).
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blood will out.3 4 With respect to adult couples, marriage is quite important
(and should be available to a larger range of couples) precisely because it
provides an easy way for two adults to signal to the world and to the State
that they have entered into a position of mutual dependence, with a set of
standard consequences for property relations and mutual care. But this is
not the family I am talking about.
The issue may be restated as, "Do families-meaning households with
dependents-already receive more than the market equality norm
requires?" The answer is probably yes. The victory of the market equality
norm has been widespread, but certainly not complete. So long as there
still is old-fashioned status-based discrimination, it would be surprising
indeed not to find remnants of the old system under which men were paid
family wages to support their dependents at home. Of course, the old
system was not tightly tied to family in this paper's sense, and neither are
the remnants-tax benefits for one-income married couples and social
security survivor benefits go to many individuals who are not families as
defined in this paper.
More positively, the victory of the market equality norm has not
entirely defeated other values. We still have public schools and public
education, perhaps the most significant form of state support for the next
generation. On the other hand, these institutions have been under attack at
least since the beginning of desegregation, when "white flight" established
the propriety of the principle of self-segregation. 35 In a mobile, marketbased society, it proved easy enough for opponents of desegregation to
simply abandon inner-city schools. Similarly, it is easy enough for the
non-childrearing to self-segregate so as to avoid paying locally based
school taxes. The effect, particularly for those children whose parent(s) are
not able to move to affluent suburbs, has been a long decline in the quality
of the public schools. 36 Market norms combined with localized funding
offer neither the means nor the justification for taxpayers to pay for the
education of other people's children.
Similarly, market pressures, combined with a continuing residue of
ideological support for the ideal of family, can lead to inconsistent and
complex effects in the private sector. For the bulk of our population, male
wages have dropped over the last generation. But for the professional elite,
the experience has been different-wages at the top have increased and at
34. WILLIAM S. GILBERT & ARTHUR SULLIVAN, H.M.S. PINAFORE (1878) (children
switched at birth act according to hereditary character); WILLIAM S. GILBERT & ARTHUR H.
SULLIVAN, THE PIRATES OF PENZANCE OR THE SLAVE OF DUTY (1879) (duty-bound pirates

turn out to be Lords).
35. Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974) (overturning inter-district busing order
intended to ameliorate effects of white flight).
36. CHRISTOPHER LASCH, REVOLT OF THE ELITES 45-47 (1995) (lamenting the ability of
the modem elite to separate themselves from dependence on public services).

2003

Gendered Workers/Market Equality

the very top have soared.37 For highly paid employees, especially in an era
of tax-phobia, untaxed benefits can be quite attractive. In the upper
echelons of the private marketplace, family-based benefits, such as
insurance, often still are not fully priced at marginal cost. Here too,
however, the trends are anti-family-family support seems unfair to
enough childless employees that there is significant pressure to eliminate
non-market-cost based benefits. Each year brings another advance for the
market norm in the form of, for example, higher fees for family insurance
coverage or conversion to "cafeteria" style benefit plans that
provide
38
caretaking.
or
need
to
than
rather
salary
to
benefits proportional
More fundamentally, whether or not family-based benefits are
disappearing in favor of a market-based baseline of pay according to
(market-assessed) marginal cost ultimately is beside the point. The more
important question is whether market pay is the correct baseline from
which to assess justice. The issue should not be whether families receive
more or less than a pure market (if such a thing could exist) would pay.
Rather, the issue is whether the market is the right baseline at all.
Under the market baseline, employees should receive pay proportional
to the product they produce (and their luck), without regard to personal
characteristics such as need, race, gender, desert, or dependents.
Dependents, who do not produce marketable commodities, should receive
nothing at all, except by courtesy of those upon whom they are dependent.
Decent societies reject the market baseline precisely because they accept
responsibility for all citizens, even those-such as children and the
elderly-who are unable to sell their labor or their product in the market.
Citizens are citizens
based on membership, not on market-assessed
39
marginal product.
I have argued that the market equality norm gives families too little.
A market, successfully barred from discriminating against women as
women, will pay employees according to the value (as determined by the
market) of their product. In general, familial obligations will be ignored by
the market, just as race and gender are supposed to be. Caregivers will
simply be forced to treat their caregiving as another form of consumption,
and those dependent on them will be nothing more than objects of charity.
But citizens of a democracy are entitled to more than charity, and decent
societies accept that they have a responsibility to both the next and the last
generation that goes beyond private consumption decisions by individuals
who are moved by the young or old. Because we have an obligation to our
37. The Nation's Economic Boom is Fattening The Wallets of Top Corporate
Executives, NEWSDAY, Aug. 30, 1999, at A6.

38. See, e.g., Fuhrmans, supra note 3 (describing reduction of family benefits and
increasing attempts to charge employees full marginal cost).
39. See supra text at note 18.
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fellow citizens, including children, we have an obligation to find nonmarket mechanisms to pay for their care.
III. Complex Status Roles: Pedestals, Soldiers, and Aristocrats
The description of the old status hierarchy and its newer partial
replacement needs to be made somewhat less stark. Gender relations are
complicated. Feminism began with a simple image of men on top and
women on the bottom, but the reality was more polymorphic in society as
in bedrooms. Women were not merely dependents, excluded from the
central financially-rewarded relations of the marketplace in a capitalist
society; they were also seen as, and even had some of the privileges of, a
pre-capitalist aristocracy living off of the productive labor of others.
Moreover, high status roles are typically a burden as well as a benefit.
The life of an aristocrat is not an easy one. Elaborate and highly artificial
rules of dress and behavior-cossets and corsets, uncomfortable shoes,
makeup, honor codes, and careful avoidance of the behavior of the
people-characterize all aristocracies. As Thorstein Veblen pointed out
long ago, it is the very difficulty of upper class consumption that makes it
honorable.40 To the extent that men were the high status group in the
gender hierarchy, maleness brought with it a set of highly restricted role
norms. Many of these rules-which I have summarized in short-hand
fashion as "men don't wear dresses," but which more importantly have to
do with male career-centeredness and social as well as economic barriers to
male involvement in childcare as a primary life-focus-have barely been
touched by the drastic changes in gender roles of the last decades. The
roles of status do not die easily, even when they are artificial and
dysfunctional-women continue to wear high-heeled shoes to be sexy, and
even if real men sometimes can get away with eating quiche, they still
bring home the bacon.
The net effect is that the stability of male role norms is
overdetermined. On the one hand, as the economic privileges of men-the
family wage and the largely effective bar on competition from womenhave broken down, many men have grasped the symbolic status-privileges
of maleness as a last vestige of dignity. Boys will not act like girls because
40. THORSTEIN VEBLEN, THE THEORY OF THE LEISURE CLASS: AN ECONOMIC STUDY OF
INSTITUTIONS 40-50 (Modem Library ed., The Viking Press 1931) (1899) (arguing that the

mark of the leisure class is "a conspicuous exemption from all useful employment," which
requires that the leisured classes develop evidence that they are using their time nonproductively, such as "the knowledge of.,. correct spelling; ... of the various forms of
domestic music and other household art; of the latest proprieties of dress, furniture and
equipage; of games, sports and fancy-bred animals ....
[T]he greater the consumption of
time and substance impliedly involved in their acquisition ... the greater the resultant good
repute.").
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that would be to step into a lower still status role.
On the other hand, women have hardly pressured to broaden the
acceptable range of maleness to the same degree that they have fought to
open the male world to women. As Aristophanes claimed in Lysistrata
long ago, much of what boys do, they do in the belief that it will impress
the girls. 4' When the girls decide that they are not interested in dating the
football captain or the soldiers, men will get the message eventually. What
then leads women, still, to look for mates who are taller, richer and older
than themselves, masculine in the most traditional sense, economic
providers rather than homemakers, careers rather than carers? Why do men
without the earnings to support a family remain unmarried?
The answers, again, must be as complex as the people who continue to
form couples in which the man is taller. To some extent, it is a simple selfprotective response-in a society in which the old ways continue to be
powerful, a traditional masculine male provider can protect. Couples who
try to gender reverse face tremendous social resistance. There is no need to
rehearse the difficulties the working wife will have in attempting to earn a
"family wage." Even where it still exists, it is less available to women.
Simultaneously, her husband will face all the classic problems of isolated
suburban housewives, but without even the partially effective social
support networks that the PTA, park benches, and churches have offered
women. Then, as an empty-nester, he will return to the job market facing
not only the same problem that women have for years (overcoming the
objective proof of a lack of commitment to the careerist role the market
rewards), but also an extra burden of prejudice for having not acted as a
"real man." If staying home for a decade is devastating to a woman's
career, it is doubly so to a man's. Many people, then, opt for the easier
way, even while doing so reinforces the very social structures that
constrained the couple in the first place.
Another aspect, perhaps less obvious and somewhat contradictory,
stems from the complexity of gender status roles. Women also have not
uniformly raced to shed the higher status parts of their traditional roles. On
a fundamental level, the classic common law legal status of husband and
wife is largely feudal, pre-capitalist, and extra-market. In the bad old days,
women were excluded from the workplace and, in a capitalist society,
consequently denied many of the privileges of income and wealth.
Feminists have demonstrated the analogues between the status of wife and
that of servant-dependency, limited legal personality, and so on. But the
feudal, non-market character of gender relations is not merely one of
master and servant. For a historical moment encompassing the middle of

41. ARISTOPHANES, LYsISTRATA 16 ([W]omen end war by agreeing on "total abstinence
from the Prick.") (Nicholas Ruddell trans., 1991).
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the twentieth century, the image of the wife-and in the upper echelons of
the economy, sometimes also the reality-was as much aristocrat as
servant.
An ideal wife in an ideal marriage was not merely barred from the
workplace but freed from it. The ideal stay-at-home housewife, like any
proper aristocrat, left productive activity to others, focusing instead on
increasingly complex and arcane consumption. In the image, sedvants
before the First World War, or appliances and processed food later, took
care of the work of homemaking. The suburban housewife, instead, was
expected to maintain her appearance, supervise the operations, develop the
style of the home and garden, entertain the guests, read and discuss
literature (but not too seriously), dabble in music, volunteer in socially
worthwhile projects, and attend church and coffee.-klatches-much the
same role that aristocrats have always held.
The life of an aristocrat, especially one who is living beyond his (or in
this case, her) means-faking the life of the truly affluent without the
resources to maintain it-is not an easy one. This was the lot of the
aristocracy of suburban womanhood. Even among the more affluent, Jean
Jacques Rousseau's attacks on the artificiality of upper class life are
precisely analogous to the rebellion against bras, high heels, makeup, and
women's forced withdrawal from economic life.42 The respectable drug
addiction of the Valium "mother's little helper" 43 era should be no surprise
to readers of aristocratic novels; opium and alcohol long helped various
aristocracies through the difficulties of courtly life. 4 Still, if privilege has
its price, most people seem to find status worth whatever it takes to achieve
it.
The image, of course, only dimly connected with reality. We may
have come closer for a brief moment to mass aristocracy than ever before,
but nonetheless, a life of leisure, even in America, is a fantasy available
only for a few. For one thing, children-who do not appear in the picture
42. JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, THE FIRST AND SECOND DISCOURSES 146-48 (Roger D.
Masters & Judith Masters trans., Roger D. Masters ed., St. Martin's Press 1964) (1750)
(arguing that art distorts natural morals); JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, EMILE 11,15 (William
Boyd trans., Teachers Coll. Press, 10th ed. 1962) (1762) ("From the beginning to the end of
civilized life, man is a slave. At birth he is sewn up in swaddling bands and at death he is
nailed in a coffin. All through he is fettered by social institutions.").
43. The Rolling Stones, Mother's Little Helper, on AFTERMATH (UK version only,

Decca SKA 4786, 1966).

See also Bruce Kennedy, The Tranquilizing of America, at

http://www.cnn.com/specials/l999/century/episodes/06/currents
(on file with the author).

(last visited Feb. 24, 2003)

44. See generally VIRGINIA BERRIDGE & GRIFFITH EDWARDS, OPIUM AND THE PEOPLE:
OPIATE USE IN NINETEENTH CENTURY ENGLAND (1981)
classes); MARTIN BOOTH, OPIUM: A HISTORY (1996).

(describing opium use among upper
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of the trophy wife-require a good deal of effort, especially in the early
years before they can be farmed out to school, television, and clubs. For
another, even with modem appliances, the full image still requires servants
to operate them. To be an aristocrat, even in this modest form, someone
else must be the serf. Necessarily, then, most housewives could not
achieve the full aspiration. Far more housewives worked hard to keep up
the appearance of leisure than actually enjoyed the life of the image. When
housewives must do the work of the servants instead of just telling them to
do it, maintaining the appearances of propriety can be old-fashioned work,
just unpaid. Women whose husbands no longer (or never) earned enough
to keep them in leisure have to work quite hard to look like they are not
working.
Still, the image of the housewife as aristocrat is critical to
understanding the changes that feminism has wrought. The pull of the
gender role image remains strong and explains some of the barriers to full
gender equality that we face today. Most significantly, the image of wife
as aristocrat partially explains some women's resistance to the changes in
male roles that are necessary if there is to be room for greater gender
equality.
To make room for women in the workplace, the vacuum at home must
be filled. To pay for dependents, someone must earn more than simple
marketability would mandate. The two problems are closely linked. Both
require that we revalue "women's work." Caretaking must be something
that men can do, honorably and prestigiously. And it must be something
that society as a whole values enough to insist that markets that do not pay
for it are markets that must be bypassed or changed.
IV. Conclusion: Beyond Markets
So far, gender equality has meant that women have been freed to act
like bachelors in a free market. The next step requires, on the one hand,
that men be freed to act like women outside the market, and on the other
hand, that women and men alike be able to overcome the limitations of
market equality. The first problem is one of status and fixed gender roles.
While the status limitations on female behavior have to some extent broken
down, the status limitations on male behavior remain in place.
Consequently, further progress in limiting gender role restrictions is
impossible until men are freed as well as women. The second problem is
the flip side of the great victories of feminism. Feminism has fought status
with market. But market equality is not human equality. The victory of the
market brings with it a new and perhaps more recalcitrant set of problems.
Feminism's largest victories have been victories of the market over
feudalism in defining women's roles. The gender role barriers that kept
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women out of jobs have been broken if not entirely demolished. Most of
the legal barriers to women entering the marketplace are gone.
Exceptions-like the ban on women serving in combat roles in the
military-become fewer each year. The barriers of prejudice and
discrimination have diminished as well. Unlike only a few decades ago,
today respectable economists can claim with a straight face that, controlling
for labor market availability, skill levels, and the like, women are paid as
much as men for comparable jobs. 45 Of course such claims are still
debatable-labor market availability in particular is a proxy for still
powerful gender role differentiation. But such claims could not even have
been made in 1965. We are far closer to the market norm of equal pay for
equal work than anyone could have predicted a remarkably short time ago.
Market norms of "gender blindness" have defeated feudal norms of
women's gendered status over and over again.
The basic idea of market equality is that a person's product can be
bought or sold on the market without regard for the status or other
characteristics of the person. It is the price and the product, not the seller
or the buyer, that is important. Indeed, in our closest approximation to the
market ideal, the stock market, the identity of buyer and seller are entirely
secret. (The contrast to aristocratic, status-based regimes could not be
stronger-medieval peasants, however rich, were barred from dressing like
aristocrats and an aristocrat, however poor, had inalienable rights not
dependent on market resources. The modem status-based regimes are
similarly strict in restraining market equality. Thus, in Soviet Russia it is
said that special lanes were reserved for the cars of party members and
access to import stores was based not on ability to pay but on hierarchal
status, while in Saudi Arabia even wealthy women may not appear in
public alone.)
Market anonymity is generally a great advance over the overarching
status hierarchies of feudal society. Low status is one of the great human
evils, causing physical illness as well as misery.46 Decent societies reduce
the gaps between high and low status individuals, but even more
importantly, they offer many and multiple status hierarchies, so that those
who are low on one scale can find others on which they are high. The great
evil of creating "discrete and insular minorities" '47 is that a single marker
affects many aspects of life, breaking down the multiple and independent
competitions of a free society.
The market anonymity principle promotes freedom in large part due to
45. See, e.g., Kathleen Parker, Women on the Verge of Wage-Gap Misinformation, CHI.
TRIB., Apr. 11, 2001, at 15.
46. See, e.g., RICHARD G. WILKINSON, MIND THE GAP: HIERARCHIEs, HEALTH AND

HUMAN EVOLUTION 10- 15 (2000) (describing health impacts of low social status).
47. United States v. Carolene Prod. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
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its hostility to unified hierarchy. Producers good at one thing are not likely
to be good at other forms of production, so there is room for many people
to find a niche in which they can be top dog. Nor is excellence in
producing for the market as stable or inheritable as aristocratic blood or
Party membership. So markets offer more options and less stability than
status-based alternatives. On the consumer side, those with more money
will have more options than those without money, and this bears a certain
resemblance to the aristocratic principle. But markets still provide more
room for consumers as well; at least in the middle class many people can
be high status consumers because there is no single defined hierarchy of
consumption.
One step at a time, feminists have used market norms to overpower
gendered restrictions on women's entry into the marketplace.48 But market
entry is not enough. Markets will work toward equal treatment of market
production-they will not, left to their own workings, create equality of
persons or value non-marketable production, including, critically, nonmonetized caregiving. The next steps for feminism, thus, will be far more
difficult; further progress conflicts with the logic of the market principle.
Paradoxically, further integration of women into the labor market will
require breaking down not only barriers to commodification but
overcoming the logic of the market itself. We need room not only for
female bachelors but for all workers with a life outside of the workplacecommitted, caregiving family members of all genders.
Left alone, markets will pay employees the minimum necessary to
replace them; in a reasonably competitive market, employees should
receive pay that is close to their marginal productivity in their next best job
and to the marginal productivity of the person who would replace them in
this one. Dependents only reduce those numbers (by reducing the
employee's productivity). So, markets will not pay for dependents.
Similarly, left to their own, markets will demand as much time as
employees are willing to give to the job, and competition will assure that
standard time demands usually will be set by the least encumbered.
Families, in short, need time and money that markets, even in the absence
of discrimination or prejudice, will not provide. Support for families
means jobs with flexible and limited hours and incomes that reflect not
only productivity but also dependents. These projects-unlike eliminating
status based bars on female employment-will require overcoming
markets, not just perfecting them.
48. Martha Ertman is taking this project in new and unexpected directions. See, e.g.,
Martha M. Ertman, Marriage as a Trade: Bridging the Private/PrivateDistinction, 36
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 79, 81 (2001) (exploring "private law's potential to provide a

metaphor that accounts for the range of intimate affiliations and counteracts the inequalities
of the natural model").

